2. Decentralized Nations

The Kurdish nation is unlikely to have ever formed had its members never left

Kurdistan. This paradox seems incomprehensible at first. How could the scattered

Kurdish people form a nation? To answer this, I will first discuss factors that

create a diaspora community.

2.1. Creating a transnationalism

Martin van Bruinessen writes, “The so-called second generation, consisting of

immigrant workers’ children who have grown up in Europe, tend to be much more

interested in Kurdish identity and Kurdish politics than their parents were,” [4]

a claim that seems impossible at first glance. Wouldn’t persons who grew up in

Germany, speaking German and participating in German culture be less Kurdish

than those who were raised in traditional Kurdistan?

I feel there are three reasons why second-generation exiles are more

nationalistic than their parents, and it’s also these reasons why transnationalism

occurs and persists. First, the increased difficulty integrating in modern society

makes exiles less likely to integrate fully or even partially into their new state.

Integration does not need to actually be arduous, rather it only needs to

be perceived as difficult or unwanted. “They” don’t want to accept “us.” An

individual’s belief that he is in exile only magnifies his reluctance to integrate.

4

He has been forced into a society that doesn’t want him, which in turn makes him

reject his new host nation and look elsewhere for acceptance, namely towards his

exiled home. Second-generation exiles are more likely to want to return to the

homeland for several reasons. A second-generation exile grows up fully aware of

her status as “the other.” She sees the discrimination her parents are subjected to,

from both the exiled homeland and the new home, and believes that a state for her

nation will solve all that she and her parents have been subjected to. Additionally,

it’s likely that she’s grown up hearing news from her homeland, reports that

promote an ethnicity she has always been acutely aware of. As a result, she

becomes increasingly nationalistic, creating hope that she may someday return

to the homeland. I believe that dreams of return are primarily only dreams, an

exiled Kurd need not want to return to Kurdistan in order to participate in the

Kurdish diaspora. He or she only needs to maintain the belief that an independent

Kurdistan will benefit Kurdish people.

I feel that the second reason transnationalism exists is precisely the same

reason that nationalism exists. For a nation to survive the scattering effects

of exile, the nation must draw on their collective “deep resources.” Anthony

Smith presented three resources with which one can measure the strength

of a nationalism [12]. I feel that we can use these same three resources to

gauge the ability of a nation to survive even when scattered across the world.

These resources are (1) a collective memory and specifically a ‘golden age,’ (2)

religious beliefs and a notion that the community is the ‘chosen people,’ and

(3) an ancestral homeland. In the case of a diaspora community, their ancestral

homeland has been taken away, so its myth strengthens the nation and serves

as a center point to bring the community together. Moreover, as Joshua Kaldor-

Robinson points out, diasporas can involve themselves within the nation in several

different ways [7]. Diaspora communities can create the “narrative of the nation,”

they can emphasize the timelessness of the nation by their refusal to integrate, and

they can invent tradition. And perhaps more importantly, diaspora communities

can influence the views and actions of nationalists back in the homeland.

Finally, technology is the wheel that drives diaspora nationalism. The

other ideas give reasons why transnationalism exists; technology is how it

exists. Instantaneous worldwide communication is so widespread that it has

drastically reshaped the way communities can and do communicate. The printing

press reshaped communication within a community, but television, radio and

the internet are completely reforming the connections in information-spread

networks. To fully understand how greatly technology has enabled diaspora

communities to thrive, I will take a much more abstract approach by examining

the networks underlying human interaction.

5

2.2. Rethinking locality

Humans have always had contacts, other individuals who they could share

information with, but in recent years the number of contacts each person has

on average has steadily increased to an estimated 400-1000 per person [13].

More important than simply gaining more contacts, people now have the ability

to maintain communication with another regardless of the physical distance

separating them. In creating instantaneous world-wide communication, humans

have restructured the topology of the social networks connecting one to another.

Social networks are marked by the presence of neighborhoods, groups of

individuals who are strongly connected, and long-distance contacts. In forming

a social network, geography has a great deal of influence, and it’s geographic

limitations that give social networks a distinctive structure. Two friends are likely

to have a third, common friend. These groups of friends that form neighborhoods,

a cluster in the network where almost everyone involved knows everyone else in the

cluster. Neighborhoods still exist in social networks, and they are likely to always

exist, however the nature of the long-distance contacts has changed dramatically

in recent years.

Figure 1 illustrates how a social network might have looked about 200 years

ago, while Figure 2 presents a modern social network. Combined, the two figures

reveal the change in structure of social networks. The primary change that has

occurred in the last hundred years is the addition of many more long-distance

contacts. People are now able to make contact with persons extremely far away in

physical distance terms. This creates a situation where people have many friends

outside of their neighborhood, enabling information to disseminate through a

community rapidly. Without going into details, it’s been shown that the new

structure of social networks greatly improves the speed that information spreads

[1, 8].

The new structure of social networks greatly influences diaspora communities.

First, the short paths between nearly everyone allow members in the diaspora

to find each other. And the network structure allows information to spread

quickly within the diaspora, since members can easily maintain contact with their

friends and relatives back in the homeland. Importantly, the new structure of social

networks makes it virtually impossible for a member of a diaspora to escape

news and influence from the homeland. Even if an exiled diaspora member cuts

off all ties to her homeland, her local neighborhood contacts keep her in touch

with the happenings of the homeland. Since any member within the network is

only a few steps away, communication throughout the community occurs nearly

instantaneously and ideas are mobilized quickly. An idea can be expressed to few,

and those few can easily spread it to the entire, interconnected community. Also,

since the diaspora community is so closely connected to the homeland nation,

the two groups can keep their goals congruent, and this “closeness” also allows

6

long-distance contacts

between neighborhoods

strongly connected

neighborhoods

Figure 1. How a social network might have looked about 200 years

ago. Persons with a large about of physical space separating them rarely

became acquaintances. Note the presents of clustered neighborhoods, with the

occasional long-distance contact connecting neighborhoods.

Figure 2. A modern social network. Long-distance contacts are prevalent, and

they make the task of finding a short path from any person to anyone else much

easier.

7

the ideas of the diaspora to influence the policies and discourse in the homeland.

From an abstract point of view, communication in a diaspora can be compared to

the communication in a particular research field, as both networks have the same

underlying topology. New ideas in a research field are spread quickly; and for

whatever reason, the opinions of some researchers are heard louder than others.

Both of these statements hold true for a diaspora as well, even more so, since the

members of a diaspora are fighting for legitimacy.

Beyond reshaping social networks, technology is empowering transnationalism

in other ways. Since the Kurdish people have never had a state of their own, a

standardized Kurdish language has not had the opportunity to develop. In recent

years, the number of Kurdish websites has grown rapidly. Everything from journalistic

and scholarly articles to Kurdish music, political propaganda, news and

banned books are now online, available for anyone to download. Interestingly, the

spread of Kurdish writings on the internet will probably lead to a standardized

Kurdish language. In this way, technology has decentralized most aspects of the

nationalism movement. Nationalism no longer needs to be local, the internet in

particular allows anyone with a desire to participate to do so, regardless of their

physical location.

3. Effects of the diaspora

Thus far, I have presented views on the formation of a diaspora, why diaspora

communities exist and how diaspora communities are able to function so

effectively. In this section I will discuss the possible effects of nationalism in

the diaspora by examining the Kurdish example.

3.1. Influence on the homeland

Given the highly interconnectedness of the world as I outlined above, it should

come as no surprise that diaspora communities have an enormous impact on the

discourse and policies of the homeland. This has certainly been the case with the

Kurdish diaspora.

A Kurd in the diaspora participates in the national discourse by utilizing

technology. He may write emails, post on websites or even broadcast an internet

radio show. He helps create the nationalist discourse; he’s a virtual player in

a deadly game. Diaspora communities do not face the same dangers as the

homeland community, so the two groups develop differing agendas. Jolle Demmers

notes that the homeland groups will likely experience fear, hunger, pain and stress,

as they are physically involved in the conflict. Meanwhile, the diaspora groups

probably feel anger, frustration or alienation [5]. This difference will affect the

attitudes of both groups. Thus, the goals of the two groups differ, but are kept

congruent due to the high degree of communication between them. In this way,

8

the homeland community is “bullied” by the diaspora community. After all, it’s

easier to push extreme ideals when your safety can’t be threatened because of

those ideals.

As diaspora communities are free from immediate dangers, they face no

consequences for their actions. Rather, they can’t see the consequences in terms

of immediate violence or action. The consequences of developing the long-distance

nationalism are felt in the actions of the host countries towards the diaspora.

3.2. Influence on the host states

Beyond influencing the politics of the homeland, diaspora communities also affect

the policies of their host countries. To examine this phenomenon, I will discuss

the Kurdish presence in Germany.

A bilateral agreement between Germany and Turkey in 1961 sparked the

first influx of Kurds from Turkey into Germany. While it’s difficult to estimate

the exact number of Kurdish people living in Germany, Lyon and Ucarer state

that around 500,000 Kurds could be mobilized within Germany [10]. The Partiya

Karkeren Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers Party is a group for an independent

Kurdistan that was founded in 1978. While the PKK has launched several

attacks in Turkey, they have found little success within the border’s of their

traditional homeland. The Turkish government responded to the PKK’s efforts

of mobilization with brutal procedures, however Germany was founded on the

principles of a liberal democracy. As such, the PKK began to organize within

Germany in the early 1980s, bringing a Kurdish separatist movement to Germany.

From the early 80s to 1993, the PKK influenced the German discourse by

bringing every example of conflict within Turkey to the attention of the German

public. The PKK would stage protest demonstrations, organize hunger strikes,

hold large-scale demonstrations and even engage in highway blocks. The PKK

was initially successful in gaining sympathy for their cause, however in 1993 the

PKK was banned within Germany. The ban was the result of the violent practices

of the PKK. The German authorities initially used their legal system to bring

justice to the PKK members who participated in violent acts, but in 1993 the

Kurds occupied the Turkish Consulate in Munich and took several hostages. Less

than six months later, the PKK attacked several Turkish-owned business and

the German authorities banned the organization outright. Naturally, the ban on

the PKK did little to stop their violent actions, PKK initiated conflict actually

increased in the three years after the ban. Banning the PKK forced the issue

more, a Kurd within Germany was then forced to confront his Kurdish identity.

The Kurdish diaspora in Germany illustrates the effects a diaspora

community can have on its host nation. First, the internal policies of Germany

have changed due to the Kurdish activities there. But the German Kurds have

influenced world politics as well, putting a strain on the relationship between

9

Germany and Turkey. Often, a major goal of diaspora communities is to influence

the politics in their host country. For instance, American Jews in the early 20th

century pushed the American government to support an independent Jewish

state. By gaining sympathy, diaspora groups can gain influence over the policies

of their host states.

4. Conclusion

By examining the formation and effects of the current Kurdish diaspora, I first

illustrated how a situation can create a diaspora. Due to the nation-building

policies of the states governing the Kurdish people’s traditional homeland, the

Kurdish people have been scattered throughout the world. I feel that diaspora

communities are a result of a differing nationalism; after all, “state nationbuilding

is almost always connected to minority nation-destroying” [9].

While the nation-building practices of states scatter people across the world,

the spread of a single ethnicity isn’t enough to create a diaspora community. I

believe that the exiled people must believe that they cannot integrate into their

new host nation. Secondly, the “deep resources” of the exiled people’s ethnicity

will form a bond between the exiles, and the desire for a homeland will lead

them towards transnationalism. Finally, technology allows the scattered people

to create a diaspora community. By making use of their social networks, the

scattered people can find each other and unite. Without the contacts enabled by

modern communication tools, diaspora groups would lose much of their power.

The emergence of diaspora groups has reshaped the way that nationalisms

operate. Nation-states have not died yet, but they are no longer the only players in

international politics. As people become more mobile, long-distance nationalism

is only likely to increase. In the study of nationalism, transnationalism is a subject

that can no longer be ignored.

10

5. References

[1] Wu, Fang, Huberman, Bernardo A., Adamic, Lada A. and Joshua R. Tyler, 2004,

Information Flow in Social Groups, PhysicaA, Vol. 337, pp 327-335.

[2] Anderson, Benedict, 1991, Imagined Communities, Verso, London and New York, pp

4-46.

[3] Anderson, Benedict, 1992, Long-Distance Nationalism: world capitalism and the rise of

identity politics, The Wertheim Lecture 1992, Centre for Asian Studies, University of

Amsterdam, pp 1-14.

[4] Bruinessen, Martin van, 2000, Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question, Working

paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute,

Florence.

[5] Demmers, Jolle, 2002, Diaspora and Conflict: locality, long-distance nationalism, and

the delocalisation of conflict dynamics, The Public/Javnost Vol. 9, no. 1.

[6] Gellner, Ernest, 1997, Nationalism, Phoenix, London, pp 1-36.

[7] Kaldor-Robinson, Joshua, 2002, ’The Virtual and the Imaginary: The Role of Diasphoric

New Media in the Construction of a National Identity during the Break-up of

Yugoslavia’, Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2002, pp 177-187.

[8] Kempe, David, Kleinberg, Jon, and Demers, Alan, 2001, Spatial gossip and resource

location protocols, Proceedings of the 33rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,

2001.

[9] Kymlicka, Will and Christine Straehle, 2000, Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and

Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature, European Journal of

Philosophy 7:1, pp 65-88.

[10] Lyon, Alynna J. and Emek M. Ucarer, 1998, The Transnational Mobilization of Ethnic

Conflict: Kurdish Separatism in Germany. Paper presented at the International

Studies Association annual meeting, Minneapolis, Minnesota, March 1998.

[11] Wahlbeck, Osten, 1998, Transnationalism and diasporas: the Kurdish example, Paper

presented at the International Sociological Associations XIV World Congress of

Sociology, Montreal, Canada, July 1998.

[12] Smith, Anthony D., 1996, ”The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the

Renewal of Nations”, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 47, No.4, pp 575-598.

[13] Wasserman, Stanley and Faust, Katerine, 1994, Social Network Analysis, Cambridge,

U.K.