Nationalism in the Diaspora a study of the Kurdish movement
2. Decentralized Nations
The Kurdish nation is unlikely to have ever formed had its members never left
Kurdistan. This paradox seems incomprehensible at first. How could the scattered
Kurdish people form a nation? To answer this, I will first discuss factors that
create a diaspora community.
2.1. Creating a transnationalism
Martin van Bruinessen writes, “The so-called second generation, consisting of
immigrant workers’ children who have grown up in Europe, tend to be much more
interested in Kurdish identity and Kurdish politics than their parents were,” [4]
a claim that seems impossible at first glance. Wouldn’t persons who grew up in
Germany, speaking German and participating in German culture be less Kurdish
than those who were raised in traditional Kurdistan?
I feel there are three reasons why second-generation exiles are more
nationalistic than their parents, and it’s also these reasons why transnationalism
occurs and persists. First, the increased difficulty integrating in modern society
makes exiles less likely to integrate fully or even partially into their new state.
Integration does not need to actually be arduous, rather it only needs to
be
perceived as difficult or unwanted. “They” don’t want to accept “us.” Anindividual’s belief that he is in exile only magnifies his reluctance to integrate.
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He has been forced into a society that doesn’t want him, which in turn makes him
reject his new host nation and look elsewhere for acceptance, namely towards his
exiled home. Second-generation exiles are more likely to want to return to the
homeland for several reasons. A second-generation exile grows up fully aware of
her status as “the other.” She sees the discrimination her parents are subjected to,
from both the exiled homeland and the new home, and believes that a state for her
nation will solve all that she and her parents have been subjected to. Additionally,
it’s likely that she’s grown up hearing news from her homeland, reports that
promote an ethnicity she has always been acutely aware of. As a result, she
becomes increasingly nationalistic, creating hope that she may someday return
to the homeland. I believe that dreams of return are primarily only dreams, an
exiled Kurd need not want to return to Kurdistan in order to participate in the
Kurdish diaspora. He or she only needs to maintain the belief that an independent
Kurdistan will benefit Kurdish people.
I feel that the second reason transnationalism exists is precisely the same
reason that nationalism exists. For a nation to survive the scattering effects
of exile, the nation must draw on their collective “deep resources.” Anthony
Smith presented three resources with which one can measure the strength
of a nationalism [12]. I feel that we can use these same three resources to
gauge the ability of a nation to survive even when scattered across the world.
These resources are (1) a collective memory and specifically a ‘golden age,’ (2)
religious beliefs and a notion that the community is the ‘chosen people,’ and
(3) an ancestral homeland. In the case of a diaspora community, their ancestral
homeland has been taken away, so its myth strengthens the nation and serves
as a center point to bring the community together. Moreover, as Joshua Kaldor-
Robinson points out, diasporas can involve themselves within the nation in several
different ways [7]. Diaspora communities can create the “narrative of the nation,”
they can emphasize the timelessness of the nation by their refusal to integrate, and
they can invent tradition. And perhaps more importantly, diaspora communities
can influence the views and actions of nationalists back in the homeland.
Finally, technology is the wheel that drives diaspora nationalism. The
other ideas give reasons why transnationalism exists; technology is
how itexists. Instantaneous worldwide communication is so widespread that it has
drastically reshaped the way communities can and do communicate. The printing
press reshaped communication within a community, but television, radio and
the internet are completely reforming the connections in information-spread
networks. To fully understand how greatly technology has enabled diaspora
communities to thrive, I will take a much more abstract approach by examining
the networks underlying human interaction.
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2.2. Rethinking locality
Humans have always had contacts, other individuals who they could share
information with, but in recent years the number of contacts each person has
on average has steadily increased to an estimated 400-1000 per person [13].
More important than simply gaining more contacts, people now have the ability
to maintain communication with another regardless of the physical distance
separating them. In creating instantaneous world-wide communication, humans
have restructured the topology of the social networks connecting one to another.
Social networks are marked by the presence of neighborhoods, groups of
individuals who are strongly connected, and long-distance contacts. In forming
a social network, geography has a great deal of influence, and it’s geographic
limitations that give social networks a distinctive structure. Two friends are likely
to have a third, common friend. These groups of friends that form neighborhoods,
a cluster in the network where almost everyone involved knows everyone else in the
cluster. Neighborhoods still exist in social networks, and they are likely to always
exist, however the nature of the long-distance contacts has changed dramatically
in recent years.
Figure 1 illustrates how a social network might have looked about 200 years
ago, while Figure 2 presents a modern social network. Combined, the two figures
reveal the change in structure of social networks. The primary change that has
occurred in the last hundred years is the addition of many more long-distance
contacts. People are now able to make contact with persons extremely far away in
physical distance terms. This creates a situation where people have many friends
outside of their neighborhood, enabling information to disseminate through a
community rapidly. Without going into details, it’s been shown that the new
structure of social networks
greatly improves the speed that information spreads[1, 8].
The new structure of social networks greatly influences diaspora communities.
First, the short paths between nearly everyone allow members in the diaspora
to find each other. And the network structure allows information to spread
quickly within the diaspora, since members can easily maintain contact with their
friends and relatives back in the homeland. Importantly, the new structure of social
networks makes it virtually impossible for a member of a diaspora to
escapenews and influence from the homeland. Even if an exiled diaspora member cuts
off all ties to her homeland, her local neighborhood contacts keep her in touch
with the happenings of the homeland. Since any member within the network is
only a few steps away, communication throughout the community occurs nearly
instantaneously and ideas are mobilized quickly. An idea can be expressed to few,
and those few can easily spread it to the entire, interconnected community. Also,
since the diaspora community is so closely connected to the homeland nation,
the two groups can keep their goals congruent, and this “closeness” also allows
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long-distance contacts
between neighborhoods
strongly connected
neighborhoods
Figure 1.
How a social network might have looked about 200 yearsago. Persons with a large about of physical space separating them rarely
became acquaintances. Note the presents of clustered neighborhoods, with the
occasional long-distance contact connecting neighborhoods.
Figure 2.
A modern social network. Long-distance contacts are prevalent, andthey make the task of finding a short path from any person to anyone else much
easier.
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the ideas of the diaspora to influence the policies and discourse in the homeland.
From an abstract point of view, communication in a diaspora can be compared to
the communication in a particular research field, as both networks have the same
underlying topology. New ideas in a research field are spread quickly; and for
whatever reason, the opinions of some researchers are heard louder than others.
Both of these statements hold true for a diaspora as well, even more so, since the
members of a diaspora are fighting for legitimacy.
Beyond reshaping social networks, technology is empowering transnationalism
in other ways. Since the Kurdish people have never had a state of their own, a
standardized Kurdish language has not had the opportunity to develop. In recent
years, the number of Kurdish websites has grown rapidly. Everything from journalistic
and scholarly articles to Kurdish music, political propaganda, news and
banned books are now online, available for anyone to download. Interestingly, the
spread of Kurdish writings on the internet will probably lead to a standardized
Kurdish language. In this way, technology has decentralized most aspects of the
nationalism movement. Nationalism no longer needs to be local, the internet in
particular allows anyone with a desire to participate to do so, regardless of their
physical location.
3. Effects of the diaspora
Thus far, I have presented views on the formation of a diaspora, why diaspora
communities exist and how diaspora communities are able to function so
effectively. In this section I will discuss the possible effects of nationalism in
the diaspora by examining the Kurdish example.
3.1. Influence on the homeland
Given the highly interconnectedness of the world as I outlined above, it should
come as no surprise that diaspora communities have an enormous impact on the
discourse and policies of the homeland. This has certainly been the case with the
Kurdish diaspora.
A Kurd in the diaspora participates in the national discourse by utilizing
technology. He may write emails, post on websites or even broadcast an internet
radio show. He helps create the nationalist discourse; he’s a virtual player in
a deadly game. Diaspora communities do not face the same dangers as the
homeland community, so the two groups develop differing agendas. Jolle Demmers
notes that the homeland groups will likely experience fear, hunger, pain and stress,
as they are physically involved in the conflict. Meanwhile, the diaspora groups
probably feel anger, frustration or alienation [5]. This difference will affect the
attitudes of both groups. Thus, the goals of the two groups differ, but are kept
congruent due to the high degree of communication between them. In this way,
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the homeland community is “bullied” by the diaspora community. After all, it’s
easier to push extreme ideals when your safety can’t be threatened because of
those ideals.
As diaspora communities are free from immediate dangers, they face no
consequences for their actions. Rather, they can’t see the consequences in terms
of immediate violence or action. The consequences of developing the long-distance
nationalism are felt in the actions of the host countries towards the diaspora.
3.2. Influence on the host states
Beyond influencing the politics of the homeland, diaspora communities also affect
the policies of their host countries. To examine this phenomenon, I will discuss
the Kurdish presence in Germany.
A bilateral agreement between Germany and Turkey in 1961 sparked the
first influx of Kurds from Turkey into Germany. While it’s difficult to estimate
the exact number of Kurdish people living in Germany, Lyon and Ucarer state
that around 500,000 Kurds could be mobilized within Germany [10]. The Partiya
Karkeren Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers Party is a group for an independent
Kurdistan that was founded in 1978. While the PKK has launched several
attacks in Turkey, they have found little success within the border’s of their
traditional homeland. The Turkish government responded to the PKK’s efforts
of mobilization with brutal procedures, however Germany was founded on the
principles of a liberal democracy. As such, the PKK began to organize within
Germany in the early 1980s, bringing a Kurdish separatist movement to Germany.
From the early 80s to 1993, the PKK influenced the German discourse by
bringing every example of conflict within Turkey to the attention of the German
public. The PKK would stage protest demonstrations, organize hunger strikes,
hold large-scale demonstrations and even engage in highway blocks. The PKK
was initially successful in gaining sympathy for their cause, however in 1993 the
PKK was banned within Germany. The ban was the result of the violent practices
of the PKK. The German authorities initially used their legal system to bring
justice to the PKK members who participated in violent acts, but in 1993 the
Kurds occupied the Turkish Consulate in Munich and took several hostages. Less
than six months later, the PKK attacked several Turkish-owned business and
the German authorities banned the organization outright. Naturally, the ban on
the PKK did little to stop their violent actions, PKK initiated conflict actually
increased in the three years after the ban. Banning the PKK forced the issue
more, a Kurd within Germany was then forced to confront his Kurdish identity.
The Kurdish diaspora in Germany illustrates the effects a diaspora
community can have on its host nation. First, the internal policies of Germany
have changed due to the Kurdish activities there. But the German Kurds have
influenced world politics as well, putting a strain on the relationship between
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Germany and Turkey. Often, a major goal of diaspora communities is to influence
the politics in their host country. For instance, American Jews in the early 20th
century pushed the American government to support an independent Jewish
state. By gaining sympathy, diaspora groups can gain influence over the policies
of their host states.
4. Conclusion
By examining the formation and effects of the current Kurdish diaspora, I first
illustrated how a situation can create a diaspora. Due to the nation-building
policies of the states governing the Kurdish people’s traditional homeland, the
Kurdish people have been scattered throughout the world. I feel that diaspora
communities are a result of a differing nationalism; after all, “state nationbuilding
is almost always connected to minority nation-destroying” [9].
While the nation-building practices of states scatter people across the world,
the spread of a single ethnicity isn’t enough to create a diaspora community. I
believe that the exiled people must believe that they cannot integrate into their
new host nation. Secondly, the “deep resources” of the exiled people’s ethnicity
will form a bond between the exiles, and the desire for a homeland will lead
them towards transnationalism. Finally, technology allows the scattered people
to create a diaspora community. By making use of their social networks, the
scattered people can find each other and unite. Without the contacts enabled by
modern communication tools, diaspora groups would lose much of their power.
The emergence of diaspora groups has reshaped the way that nationalisms
operate. Nation-states have not died yet, but they are no longer the only players in
international politics. As people become more mobile, long-distance nationalism
is only likely to increase. In the study of nationalism, transnationalism is a subject
that can no longer be ignored.
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5. References
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Information Flow in Social Groups,
PhysicaA, Vol. 337, pp 327-335.[2] Anderson, Benedict, 1991,
Imagined Communities, Verso, London and New York, pp4-46.
[3] Anderson, Benedict, 1992, Long-Distance Nationalism: world capitalism and the rise of
identity politics, The Wertheim Lecture 1992, Centre for Asian Studies, University of
Amsterdam, pp 1-14.
[4] Bruinessen, Martin van, 2000, Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question, Working
paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute,
Florence.
[5] Demmers, Jolle, 2002, Diaspora and Conflict: locality, long-distance nationalism, and
the delocalisation of conflict dynamics,
The Public/Javnost Vol. 9, no. 1.[6] Gellner, Ernest, 1997,
Nationalism, Phoenix, London, pp 1-36.[7] Kaldor-Robinson, Joshua, 2002, ’The Virtual and the Imaginary: The Role of Diasphoric
New Media in the Construction of a National Identity during the Break-up of
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[11] Wahlbeck, Osten, 1998, Transnationalism and diasporas: the Kurdish example, Paper
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[12] Smith, Anthony D., 1996, ”The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the
Renewal of Nations”,
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